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Initially ignored, and subsequently thought to be disruptive, emotions have his-
torically received a bum rap from decision researchers (George Loewenstein and 
Jennifer S. Lerner 2003; Alice M. Isen 2008). A great deal of recent research, how-
ever, has shown that emotions can have important and, in the case of mild posi-
tive affect, often salutary effects (Isen 2008). For example, positive affect has been 
shown to increase cognitive flexibility (Isen 2008); reciprocity in “gift-exchange” 
games (Georg Kirchsteiger, Luca Rigotti, and Aldo Rustichini 2006); work effort 
and productivity (Amir Erez and Isen 2005; Andrew Oswald, Eugenio Proto, 
and Daniel Sgroi 2008); loss aversion (Isen, Thomas E. Nygren, and Gregory F. 
Ashby1988); and risk aversion when the stakes are high (Isen and Nehemia Geva 
1987). It has also been shown to decrease spending and willingness to pay (Lerner, 
Deborah A. Small, and Loewenstein 2004; Cynthia E. Cryder et al. 2008); and risk 
aversion when the stakes are low (Isen and Geva 1987). We conduct a random-
assignment experiment to investigate whether positive affect impacts time prefer-
ence, where time preference denotes a preference for present over future utility 
(Shane Frederick, Loewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue 2002). Our results indicate 
that mild positive affect significantly reduces subjects’ time preference.
Because an individual’s rate of time preference affects his or her decisions, econo-
mists have shown tremendous interest in modeling and estimating time  preference 
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(Richard H. Thaler and Hersh M. Shefrin 1981; Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec 
1992; David Laibson 1997; Maribeth Coller and Melonie B. Williams 1999; 
O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin 1999; Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer 2001; 
John T. Warner and Saul Pleeter 2001; Glenn W. Harrison, Morten I. Lau, and 
Williams 2002; Coller, Harrison, and E. Elisabet Rutstrom 2003; Ariel Rubinstein 
2003; Jess Benhabib and Alberto Bisin 2005; Harrison and Lau 2005; Jesse M. 
Shapiro 2005; Steffen Andersen et al. 2008). Time preference has been shown to 
be commonplace, is believed to lead to self-control problems, and may increase the 
likelihood of negative outcomes—for example, overconsumption, obesity, addic-
tion, reduced human capital accumulation, and diminished retirement saving (Kris 
N. Kirby, Nancy M. Petry, and Warren K. Bickel 1999; Frederick, Loewenstein, and 
O’Donoghue 2002; B. Douglas Bernheim and Antonio Rangel 2004; John Ameriks 
et al. 2007; Benhabib, Bisin, and Andrew Schotter 2010). Walter Mischel, Yuichi 
Shoda, and Monica L. Rodriguez (1989) found that preschoolers’ ability to delay 
gratification was a strong predictor of SAT scores over a decade later.
Initial empirical evidence for our result comes from the General Social Survey 
(GSS), which in three waves (1973, 1974, and 1976) includes both a measure of 
self-reported happiness (“Taken all together, how would you say things are these 
days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?”) and 
time preference (agreement or disagreement with the statement, “Nowadays, a per-
son has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.”). We find 
that happier respondents are less likely to agree with the “live for today” statement 
than are less happy respondents. This holds even after controlling for covariates that 
have been shown to be related to happiness (see Appendix Table A1 for regression 
results). While this empirical evidence provides loose support for our result, it has a 
number of shortcomings. Most notably, the direction of causation cannot be identi-
fied. Further, this measure of time preference is imperfect at best. While in this paper 
we will study the impact of mild positive affect—rather than happiness—on time 
preference, our methodology will address both of these shortcomings.1
To explore the relationship between mild positive affect and time preference, we 
run a random-assignment experiment in which subjects’ time preference is measured 
after their mood has been manipulated. Specifically, subjects are randomly assigned 
to the treatment group (positive affect) or the control group (neutral affect). The 
appropriate affect is induced using short video clips. Time preference is measured 
using a standard matching procedure, in which subjects report the present value of a 
future payment and truthful responses are incentivized.
Our results indicate that subjects in the treatment group exhibit significantly lower 
time preference than do subjects in the control group. This result is robust to vari-
ous specification checks. The next section of this paper provides a brief overview 
of the literature; the third and fourth sections describe the experimental design and 
the econometric specifications, respectively; the fifth section presents the results; 
the sixth section discusses three alternative explanations for the result; finally, in the 
discussion section, potential mechanisms are discussed, along with implications of 
the result.
1 The degree to which one can generalize from our result to the impact of happiness on time preference is 
explored in the discussion section.
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I. Literature Review
The impact of mild positive affect on decision making has been extensively stud-
ied over the past 20 years. Researchers, most notably Alice M. Isen, have conducted 
controlled experiments that demonstrate that mild positive affect can have beneficial 
effects on decision making, increasing cognitive flexibility, work effort, helpful-
ness, and creativity (recent reviews include Sonja Lyubomirsky, Laura King, and Ed 
Diener 2005; Isen 2008). Moreover, mild positive affect does not appear to impede 
decision making as many would expect it to. For example, there is no experimental 
evidence that mild positive affect causes individuals to be impulsive, thoughtless, or 
overly optimistic (Isen 2007).
Research that explores the impact of positive affect on self-control is most rel-
evant to our study, since the psychological concept of a lack of self-control overlaps 
with the economic concept of time preference. For example, Dianne M. Tice and 
Ellen Bratslavsky (2000) reported that psychologists generally understand a lack 
of self-control to be distinguished by a proclivity toward short-term gains, even 
in the face of long-term costs. Three recent psychological studies are of particu-
lar interest: first, Roy E. Baumeister, Bratslavsky, and Tice (1998) found that mild 
positive (negative) affect increases (decreases) the proportion of time subjects spent 
studying for a nonincentivized test in the laboratory; second, Isen and Johnmarshall 
Reeve (2005) demonstrated that mild positive affect increases intrinsic motiva-
tion for interesting tasks; and third, Isen (2007) reported that mild positive affect 
replenishes will power.2 These results are taken to indicate that mild positive affect 
increases forward-looking thinking, the ability to stay on task, and self-control. In 
summary, this line of research is far smaller and less well corroborated than other 
research regarding the impact of mild positive affect on decision making, leading 
Isen and Reeve (2005) to conclude that “the topic of the role of positive affect in 
development of self-control seems a promising one for investigation.”
A related strand of economic literature considers the effect of self-control on sub-
jective well-being. This research attempts to identify the impact of poor self-control 
by comparing the happiness of individuals who make decisions that are thought 
to result from a lack of self-control to those who do not make such decisions. For 
example, Bruno S. Frey, Christine Benesch, and Alois Stutzer (2007) found that 
frequent TV watchers report being less happy; and Stutzer (2007) found that obe-
sity reduces the subjective well-being of individuals who report having limited 
 self-control. Further, Jonathan Gruber and Sendhil Mullainathan (2005) found that 
cigarette taxes increase happiness among individuals prone to smoke. The authors 
interpreted the tax as a self-control device, which suggests that a lack of self-control 
may cause unhappiness. These studies appear to indicate that a lack of self-control 
reduces happiness. By extension this suggests that time preference may affect posi-
tive affect. While this direction of causation—the opposite of the one tested in this 
2 Six more studies considering the effect of affect on self-control have been conducted exclusively with young 
children (Mischel, Brian Coates, and Antonette Raskoff 1968; Mischel, Ebbe B. Ebbesen, and Antonette Raskoff 
Zeiss 1973; Bill Underwood, Bert S. Moore, and D. L. Rosenhan 1973; Gloria Seeman and J. Conrad Schwarz 
1974; P. S. Fry 1975; and Schwarz and Pamela R. Pollack 1977). For developmental reasons, the results of these 
papers cannot be generalized to adults (Alessandro Bucciol, Daniel Houser, and Marco Piovesan 2011).
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study—may hold, it is outside of the scope of the current paper to explore this 
possibility.3
Finally, this research adds to a small literature regarding the determinants of time 
preference. Two well-established results in this literature are that (i) the magnitude 
of the future payment, and (ii) the length of time over which discounting occurs, are 
important determinants of time preference (Thaler 1981; Kirby and Nino Marakovic 
1996). More recently, it has been shown that (i) high cognitive load increases time 
preference (John M. Hinson, Tina L. Jameson, and Paul Whitney 2003; Daniel J. 
Benjamin, Sebastian A. Brown, and Shapiro 2006); and (ii) individuals with greater 
cognitive skills, as measured by IQ tests, exhibit lower time preference (Stephen V. 
Burks et al. 2009). This study adds to the literature by identifying a new determinant 
of time preference.
II. Experimental Design
We examined the effect of positive affect on time preference in a laboratory 
experiment conducted at Santa Clara University. In brief, the experimental proce-
dure was as follows (additional details are provided below). First, subjects read 
and signed an informed-consent form. Second, subjects were instructed (i) that 
they would be answering 30 time-preference questions; (ii) that their payment 
would be based on one of these questions; (iii) that the payment question would 
be determined randomly at the end of the session; (iv) that a mechanism would 
be used to provide an incentive for truthful responses; and (v) that they would 
receive certificates of guarantee for their payments that could be redeemed for 
cash off-site after the experiment. Third, the mood-inducement procedure was 
administered. Fourth, subjects answered the 30 time-preference questions. Fifth, 
subjects answered questions regarding their subjective well-being and mood. 
Sixth, payments were determined. Seventh, subjects answered questions regarding 
their demographic and psychological characteristics. Finally, subjects received 
their certificates of guarantee, which included detailed redemption instructions. 
In total, the experiment lasted approximately 45 minutes, and subjects received an 
average of $24 for their participation.
A. participants
Sixty-nine undergraduate students were recruited from introductory English 
courses that all Santa Clara students are required to take; these courses were chosen 
in an attempt to avoid potential disciplinary bias.
B. participant Instructions
After completing the informed-consent form, subjects received detailed written 
instructions, which were also read aloud by the experimenter. The  instructions 
3 An additional paper, Eleanor H. Wertheim and Schwarz (1983), found that self-reported depression was cor-
related with a preference for immediate (delayed) benefits (costs). This study is correlational and does not provide 
any evidence regarding a causal relationship in either direction.
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introduced the time-preference questions and informed the subjects that the 
experimental procedure had been designed to encourage truthful responses. 
Specifically, subjects were told that the 30 time-preference questions would be 
of the following form: “What amount of money, $p, if paid to you today would 
make you indifferent to $m paid to you in t days?” Five values of m, {$11.34, 
$18.31, $24.28, $32.84, $51.71}, and six values of t, {1 day, 3 days, 7 days, 14 
days, 28 days, 56 days}, were used. We chose abstruse values for m to discourage 
the use of heuristics, such as answering one-half of m for each p. The questions 
were randomized so that there was no pattern in the order of the values of m or 
t; this was done to avoid anchoring. The time delay, t, was not extended beyond 
two months so that all possible payouts would occur within the academic term. 
Also, values of t were chosen to avoid weekends and school holidays and, with 
the exception of the one- and three-day delays, to fall on the same day of the week 
as the experimental session.
Subjects were informed that their payment would be based on one of the 30 
time-preference questions, that the payment question would be determined ran-
domly at the end of the session, and, thus, that they should answer each question 
as if their payment depended on it. Subjects were then introduced to the Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism and informed that it would be used to 
provide an incentive for truthfully answering the 30 time-preference questions 
(Gordon M. Becker, Morris H. Degroot, and Jacob Marschak 1964; Benhabib, 
Bisin, and Schotter 2010). Specifically, the amount and timing of the payment 
were determined as follows (using the BDM mechanism): m balls numbered 1 
through m were placed in a spinner, and one was chosen. If the number R on the 
drawn ball was less than or equal to p, then the subject was paid $m in t days. If the 
number drawn exceeded p, the subject was paid $R on the day of the experimental 
session. Finally, note that since the values of m were fractional, the number of 
balls placed in the spinner was rounded to the next highest integer. For example, if 
m = $11.34, then balls numbered 1 through 12 were placed in the spinner. Finally, 
subjects were guided through numerous examples in an attempt to ensure that they 
understood the process.4
Subjects were also informed of the payment-pickup process, which was designed 
carefully in an attempt to equalize the transaction costs and uncertainty associated 
with experimental payments—challenging design issues in all time-preference 
experiments. For example, consider a design wherein present payments are distrib-
uted on-site at the end of the experimental session, and future payments are distrib-
uted off-site. Then the transaction costs associated with future payments are higher 
than those associated with present payments (since future payments require subjects 
to make an additional trip to retrieve their payment). Consequently, subjects’ prefer-
ence for present versus future payments could be affected by this cost differential, 
confounding any measure of time preference.
In our experiment, subjects were issued certificates of guarantee at the end of 
the experimental session for all payments. These certificates were redeemable for 
4 Subjects did not answer the 30 time-preference questions at this time. Rather, they answered them immediately 
following the mood-inducement procedure. This order of events eliminated the possibility that the induced mood 
could have been moderated, if not nullified, by reading the participant instructions.
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cash at an administrative office, which was in a different building than the one in 
which the experimental session was conducted (see Coller and Williams 1999; 
Harrison, Lau, and Williams 2002). The certificate also indicated the payment 
amount and the location where, and time after which, the certificate could be 
redeemed for cash. Even subjects receiving present (same-day) payments were 
required to wait one hour to redeem their certificates. Further, the certificate 
included contact information for the experimenters—professors at Santa Clara 
University—and instructed subjects to contact the experimenters if there were any 
problems redeeming their certificates (see James Andreoni and Charles Sprenger 
2010a, b).
Subjects were also informed of the anonymous and blind nature of the payment 
process. They were told (i) that one person would prepare the payment envelopes; 
(ii) that a second person would distribute the sealed payment envelopes; (iii) that 
neither would know the subject’s identity, only the subject identification number; 
and (iv) that the envelope-distributor would not know the payment amount. This 
procedure was implemented in an attempt to minimize the potentially confounding 
role of subject-experimenter reciprocity.
C. Mood-Inducement procedure
We attempted to manipulate subjects’ mood by showing them a short film clip. 
The use of film clips to induce moods is common in psychological and, increasingly, 
economic experiments (James J. Gross and Robert W. Levenson 1995; Kirchsteiger, 
Rigotti, and Rustichini 2006; Jonathan Rottenberg, Rebecca D. Ray, and Gross 
2007; Oswald, Proto, and Sgroi 2008). Rainer Westerman et al. (1996) evaluated 
eleven mood-inducement procedures. They found that the use of film or story was 
the most effective means of inducing positive affect.
In our experiment, half of the subjects (34 of 69) were randomly assigned to the 
treatment group and watched a film clip intended to induce positive affect. The other 
half of the subjects (35 of 69) were assigned to the control group and watched a film 
clip intended to induce neutral affect. Except for the variant film clip, the experi-
mental protocol was identical for the control and treatment groups.
Our choice of film clips followed Gross and Levenson (1995). There, over 200 
film clips were evaluated for their efficacy in inducing each of 7 different affects. 
Nearly 500 subjects were asked to rate on a scale from 0 to 8 the greatest intensity 
of each affect they felt during the course of the film clip. The strongest affect felt 
during the clip was dubbed the target affect for that film. The authors then reported 
the two most effective clips for inducing each of the affects.
In our experiment, the positive-affect film clip was a short montage of stand-up 
comedy bits from the 2002 Robin Williams: Live on Broadway. This choice fol-
lowed directly from Gross and Levenson (1995), in which one of the two most 
successful positive-affect-inducing film clips was Robin Williams’s 1986 A Night at 
the Met. We opted for the 2002 montage primarily because it was more current and 
reduced concerns of the humor being outdated. The neutral-affect film clip was also 
one commonly used by psychologists and featured tranquil images of landscapes 
and wildlife in Denali National Park, Alaska (for example, Rottenberg, Ray, and 
Gross 2007).
3115IFCHER AND zARgHAMEE: HAppINEss AND TIME pREFERENCEVOL. 101 NO. 7
The success of the mood-inducement procedure was measured using the Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), which was administered immediately after 
the time-preference questions. The PANAS asks subjects to rate on a scale from 1 
to 10 how much of each of 7 positive and 9 negative affects they feel. The positive 
affects are amusement, arousal, contentment, happiness, interest, relief, and sur-
prise; the negative affects are anger, confusion, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, 
fear, pain, sadness, and tension. In addition, subjects were asked whether the film 
clip made them happier, sadder, or neither; and whether the film clip put them in a 
better mood, worse mood, or neither.
D. Time-preference Questions and Completing the session
Immediately following the mood-inducement procedure, subjects answered 
the 30 time-preference questions. Then, subjects answered questions about their 
subjective well-being. Next, the payment question was determined, and the BDM 
mechanism was implemented. Finally, subjects answered questions regarding their 
demographic and psychological characteristics, including happiness and personal-
ity traits.
The measure of happiness comes from the question, “Taken all together, 
how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are … ,” 
where possible responses ranged from 1 (completely unhappy) to 7 (completely 
happy). This measure is similar to the ones used in the GSS and the World 
Values Survey (WVS), each of which has been used extensively in the happi-
ness-economics literature as a measure of long-term happiness. The GSS, how-
ever, uses a three-point scale and the WVS a four-point scale. We expanded 
the scale to seven points to increase sensitivity. This question was asked after 
the mood-inducement procedure and the time-preference questions, but because 
of its broad scope, it should not have been affected by the treatment (Daniel 
Kahneman, Diener, and Norbert Schwarz 1999).
When all surveys were completed, subjects received certificates of guarantee for 
their payments and exited the experimental session.
III. Econometric Specifications
In analyzing the relationship between positive affect and time preference, we con-
sider a model of the form








  α t  I T (t) 
















  λ Kk  I K (k) + ε,
where H is a dummy for the positive-affect treatment, M is the set of all future pay-
ment amounts m, T is the set of all time delays t (in days), and p is the subjective 
present value of $m in t days. The indicator functions IM(m) and IT(t) take the value 
of one for a given m and t, respectively, and zero otherwise; this specification allows 
for all possible linear and interacted effects of time delay and future payments on 
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discounting. The model also includes demographic controls. The set of controls is 
denoted by K, and for a given control, k is the set of possible values. For example, 
for K = gender, k ∈ {male, female}, and Igender(male) equals one if the subject is 
male, and zero otherwise.
In this specification, the amount $p necessary today to be indifferent to $m in t 
days is considered to be a function of m, t, and m × t; that is, the regression is fully 
saturated with respect to the effect of time and future payments on present value. 
The appeal of this econometric specification is that it imposes minimal ex ante struc-
ture and does not depend on the distribution of p. Thus, this parametrization does 
not restrict us to a specific model of discounting and fits the conditional expectation 
function for p perfectly (Joshua D. Angrist and Jorn-Steffen Pischke 2009).
Our choice of the fully saturated model follows from the underwhelming support 
we found for the exponential, fixed-cost, and hyperbolic models of discounting, 
which we estimated and tested using the techniques described in Benhabib, Bisin, 
and Schotter (2010).5 Those authors also rejected the exponential and hyperbolic 
models, though they found support for fixed-cost discounting.
Finally, OLS is used to estimate equation (1). Corrected standard errors are calcu-
lated by clustering observations by subject; this is necessary since subjects answered 
30 questions and their responses are unlikely to be independent.
IV. Results
A. Demographic Characteristics of subjects
There is no significant difference between the values of any of the demographic 
characteristics for the treatment and control groups, so random assignment is valid 
ex post (see Table 1). Approximately half of the subjects are female. The division 
of students across colleges roughly mimics the university’s population. Santa Clara 
University has three colleges: arts and sciences, business, and engineering. Only 
a small number of subjects are in the engineering college; the rest are evenly split 
between arts and sciences and business. Roughly half of the subjects report that they 
practice a religion. Given that Santa Clara is a Jesuit university, it is not surprising 
that the most heavily represented religion is Christianity, accounting for three-quar-
ters of the subjects. Almost all other subjects consider themselves atheists, with only 
two students identifying a different religion. The next demographic factor we con-
trol for is race. Almost all of the subjects consider themselves white (63 percent), 
Asian (20 percent), or Hispanic (14 percent), with only two subjects identifying 
with other racial/ethnic categories. Finally, subjects were asked to give their best 
estimate of their family income. The mean response falls in the $100,000–$150,000 
category, while the median is in $150,000–$200,000 category. Few students report 
family income of less than $80,000 or greater than $500,000.
As noted above, the measure of long-term happiness is hypothesized to be 
unaffected by mood inducement. Indeed, there is no statistical difference in hap-
piness for the treatment and control groups. Mean responses, reported with other 
5 Please contact the authors for complete results.
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 descriptive statistics in Table 1 are indistinguishable (t-test p-value = 0.923), as is 
the response distribution (χ2 p-value = 0.353). Thus, it appears that long-term hap-
piness is independent of short-term affective shocks.
B. subjects Exhibit Time preference
As in Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter (2010), discounting will be represented by D, 
the factor that, when multiplied by m, yields the dollar amount p necessary today to 
make one indifferent to $m in t days: D = p/m. Discounting may itself depend on 
the levels of m and t, so D = D(m, t). Without this structure, comparisons of p across 
different values of m would be meaningless, since p’s domain is defined by m. This 










Observations 35 34 69
Female 0.51 0.47 0.49
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
College: Arts and sciences 0.49 0.41 0.45
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
    Business 0.43 0.41 0.42
(0.08) (0.09) (0.06)
    Engineering 0.09 0.18 0.13
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
Practicing a religion 0.49 0.44 0.46
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Religion: Atheist 0.26 0.18 0.22
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
      Christian 0.71 0.74 0.73
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
      Other religions 0.03 0.09 0.06
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Race: White 0.57 0.68 0.63
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
   Hispanic 0.17 0.12 0.14
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
   Asian 0.23 0.18 0.20
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
   Other 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Family income < $100,000 0.23a 0.15 0.19 a
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Family income between $100,000 and $200,000 0.34 a 0.38 0.36 a
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
Family income > $200,000 0.40 a 0.47 0.43 a
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Happiness 5.00 4.97 4.99
(0.21) (0.22) (0.15)
Notes: Difference of means test reveals that none of the means is significantly different. 
Standard errors reported in parentheses.
a One missing observation. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
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estimated using the absolute level of p as the dependent variable. Table 2 presents 
observed values of D for all (m, t)-combinations; Table 2A pools all subjects, and 
Tables 2B and 2C present the treatment and control groups, respectively.
Subjects consistently discount the distant future more heavily than they do the 
near future. Holding m constant, D clearly trends downward in all panels of Table 2; 
this is visualized in Figure 1A for the pooled data. In Tables 2A and 2C, there are 
few exceptions to the downward trend. The monotonicity of the negative relation-
ship between D and t is violated more frequently in the positive-affect treatment (see 
Table 2B), but in general the relationship holds.
The relationship between future payment m and the discount factor D, holding 
t constant, does not follow so consistent a pattern. For virtually no time delay t is 
Table 2A– D(m, t), Pooled Data, 69 Subjects
t(Days)
m(Dollars) 1 3 7 14 28 56 Mean
$11.34 0.910 0.890 0.846 0.814 0.795 0.766a 0.837a
(0.215) (0.171) (0.203) (0.210) (0.238) (0.260) (0.223)
$18.31 0.928 0.889 0.856 0.833 0.786 0.752 0.841
(0.200) (0.195) (0.217) (0.207) (0.235) (0.272) (0.229)
$24.28 0.910b 0.893 0.853 0.838 0.847 0.757 0.849b
(0.221) (0.201) (0.227) (0.209) (0.169) (0.253) (0.219)
$32.84 0.915 0.898 0.851 0.857a 0.775 0.778 0.846a
(0.211) (0.177) (0.219) (0.160) (0.252) (0.244) (0.219)
$51.71 0.931 0.882 0.889 0.840 0.823 0.779 0.857
(0.212) (0.241) (0.248) (0.258) (0.246) (0.265) (0.249)
Mean 0.919b 0.890 0.859 0.836a 0.805 0.766a 0.846c
(0.211) (0.197) (0.222) (0.211) (0.230) (0.258) (0.228)
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses.
a One missing response.
b Three missing responses.
c Five missing responses.
Table 2B– D(m, t), Treatment Group, 34 Subjects
t(Days)
m(Dollars) 1 3 7 14 28 56 Mean
$11.34 0.941 0.909 0.874 0.837 0.841 0.806 0.868
(0.167) (0.123) (0.159) (0.214) (0.198) (0.246) (0.192)
$18.31 0.947 0.906 0.910 0.875 0.813 0.786 0.873
(0.157) (0.184) (0.131) (0.149) (0.232) (0.258) (0.197)
$24.28 0.968b 0.936 0.892 0.901 0.895 0.832 0.903b
(0.071) (0.115) (0.160) (0.114) (0.131) (0.203) (0.143)
$32.84 0.933 0.928 0.889 0.889a 0.813 0.839 0.882a
(0.173) (0.107) (0.159) (0.129) (0.224) (0.213) (0.176)
$51.71 0.963 0.903 0.964 0.871 0.851 0.840 0.899
(0.171) (0.211) (0.053) (0.209) (0.231) (0.222) (0.197)
Mean 0.950b 0.917 0.906 0.875a 0.843 0.821 0.885c
(0.152) (0.153) (0.141) (0.168) (0.206) (0.228) (0.182)
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses.
a One missing response.
b Two missing responses.
c Three missing responses.
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there monotonicity in D with respect to m. Nor is there a clear nonmonotonic trend 
(for example, in Table 2A, for t = 1, D has two interior peaks; for t = 14, there 
appears to be an inverted U-shape; and for t = 56, a U-shape).
C. Mood Inducement Is successful
Mood inducement had the intended effect on affect. The net positive affect—the 
sum of the positive affects minus the sum of negative affects from the PANAS—
of subjects in the positive-affect treatment was significantly higher than that of 
Table 2C–D(m, t), Control Group, 35 Subjects
t(Days)
m(Dollars) 1 3 7 14 28 56 Mean
$11.34 0.880 0.871 0.819 0.792 0.751 0.725a 0.807a
(0.252) (0.208) (0.237) (0.208) (0.268) (0.356) (0.246)
$18.31 0.909 0.873 0.803 0.792 0.760 0.719 0.809
(0.235) (0.206) (0.268) (0.246) (0.239) (0.284) (0.253)
$24.28 0.856a 0.852 0.816 0.777 0.800 0.684 0.798a
(0.292) (0.253) (0.274) (0.258) (0.190) (0.277) (0.263)
$32.84 0.897 0.869 0.815 0.828 0.738 0.718 0.811
(0.243) (0.223) (0.261) (0.182) (0.274) (0.259) (0.248)
$51.71 0.897 0.861 0.816 0.810 0.795 0.720 0.817
(0.243) (0.268) (0.330) (0.299) (0.260) (0.293) (0.286)
Mean 0.889a 0.865 0.814 0.800 0.769 0.713a 0.808b
(0.251) (0.230) (0.272) (0.240) (0.246) (0.274) (0.259)
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses.
a One missing response.
b Two missing responses.
Table 2D–{DTreatment(m, t) − DControl(m, t)}, 34 Subjects in Treatment Group,  
35 Subjects in Control Group 
t(Days)
m(Dollars) 1 3 7 14 28 56 Mean
$11.34 0.061 0.039 0.055 0.045 0.091 0.080a 0.055
(0.052) (0.041) (0.049) (0.051) (0.057) (0.063) (0.037)
$18.31 0.038 0.034 0.107** 0.082* 0.053 0.067 0.063
(0.048) (0.047) (0.051) (0.049) (0.057) (0.065) (0.041)
$24.28 0.111**a,b 0.083* 0.076 0.125** 0.094** 0.149** 0.111***
(0.051) (0.048) (0.054) (0.048) (0.039) (0.059) (0.039)
$32.84 0.036 0.059 0.074 0.060b 0.074 0.122** 0.072*
(0.051) (0.042) (0.052) (0.038) (0.060) (0.057) (0.040)
$51.71 0.064 0.043 0.149** 0.061 0.055 0.120* 0.082
(0.051) (0.058) (0.057) (0.062) (0.059) (0.063) (0.050)
Mean 0.065 0.051 0.092** 0.076* 0.073 0.099* 0.081**
(0.046)  (0.042) (0.046) (0.041)  (0.046) (0.052) (0.039)
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
a One missing observation in control group.
b Two missing observations in treatment group.
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subjects in the neutral-affect treatment (7.364 versus 0.531, p-value = 0.048 for 
one-sided t-test). Further, controlling for payment, watching the positive-affect clip 
made subjects significantly more likely to state that the film clip made them happier 
(p-value = 0.048) and put them in a better mood (p-value = 0.076).6
D. positive Affect Reduces Time preference
Preliminary support for positive affect reducing time preference can be seen in 
Table 2D, which reports the difference between DTreatment (m, t) and DControl (m, t). This 
difference is positive for each (m, t) combination; the positive-affect inducement 
6 The last two affect checks are in the final questionnaire, which was administered after the payments were deter-





























Panel B. D(m, t), averaging over m, by treatment, where avg = average, 
tr = treatment, and c = control
Panel A. D(m, t), holding m constant, pooled data
avg (treatment) $11.34 (tr) $18.31 (tr)
$24.28 (tr) $32.84 (tr) $51.71 (tr)
avg (control) $11.34 (c) $18.31 (c)
$24.28 (c) $32.84 (c) $51.71 (c)
Figure 1
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unambiguously reduces time preference. This is visualized in Figure 1, panel B, 
which separately illustrates the discount factors for the control and treatment groups 
over time delay t; the average discount factor for each group is emphasized.
Estimating equation (1) without demographic controls, we see further evidence 
that positive affect reduces time preference. Controlling for future payment amount 
and time delay, watching a positive- instead of neutral-affect film clip increases the 
present value of future payments by $2.20 on average (see column 1 of Table 3). 
This result is marginally statistically significant, with a p-value = 0.054. Further, the 
magnitude is quite substantial. Even for the largest value of m, $51.71, the increase 
in the present value of the future payment is over 4 percent. Since we are not study-
ing the effects of time and monetary sums on time preference, the coefficients of the 
m and t dummies and their interactions are not presented.
In column 2, controls are added for gender, race, family income, religion, regular 
religious service attendance, and college. Treatment is now statistically significant, 
increasing present value by $2.01 on average. In columns 3 and 4, the analyses of 
columns 1 and 2, respectively, are repeated controlling for self-reported, long-term 
happiness. The main effect is stable regardless of the specification; thus, the results 
appear to be robust.7 Finally, we estimate equation (1) conditional on p < m; that is, 
we exclude observations in which subjects did not discount. With the restricted sam-
ple, the magnitude and the significance of the treatment effect increase (see columns 5 
through 8 of Table 3). The positive-affect inducement now increases the present value 
of a future payment by an average of $3.00 in each of the four restricted specifications.
7 These results are robust to inclusion of the summed responses to the statements regarding personality traits, for 
which there was no statistically significant difference by treatment.
Table 3—Results of Estimating Equation (1) 
(Dependent variable is present value, p)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment 2.202* 2.012** 2.337** 2.416** 2.997** 3.027** 3.028** 3.507***
(1.124) (0.958) (1.100) (1.002) (1.352) (1.159) (1.265) (1.207)
Only discounter included — — — — Yes Yes Yes Yes
College — Yes — Yes — Yes — Yes
Gender — Yes — Yes — Yes — Yes
Race — Yes — Yes — Yes — Yes
Religion — Yes — Yes — Yes — Yes
Practicing — Yes — Yes — Yes — Yes
Income — Yes — Yes — Yes — Yes
Self-reported happiness — — Yes Yes — — Yes Yes
Excludes observations,  
 where p = m
— — — — Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.748 0.794 0.751 0.795 0.680 0.744 0.683 0.745
Observations 2,065 2,035 2,065 2,035 1,471 1,447 1,471 1,447
Clusters 69 68 69 68 58 57 58 57
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. For five observations, the reported value of p was unintelli-
gible and thus excluded from all specifications. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 have one fewer cluster, and up to 30 fewer 
observations, than columns 1, 3, 5, and 7, respectively, because one subject had unreported demographic character-
istics. Columns 5–8 exclude observations where p = m. Ten subjects had p = m for all observations; thus there are 
ten fewer clusters in 5–8 than in 1–4.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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In summary, our experiment demonstrates that mild positive affect significantly 
increases the present value of a future payment, a result that is robust to a number of 
econometric-specification checks. The magnitude of the increase depends on the value 
of the future payment and the specification, ranging from 4 percent of the future pay-
ment (specification 2, m = $51.71) to 30 percent (specification 8, m = $11.34).
V. Alternative Explanations
We interpret the increase in the present value of a future payment for subjects in 
the positive-affect treatment, relative to those in the neutral-affect treatment, to indi-
cate that positive affect increases the discount factor. There are at least three other 
interpretations of our finding: (i) that the timing of the payment affects the perceived 
probability of receiving the payment; (ii) that affect influences risk preferences; and 
(iii) that positive affect substitutes for money.
To diminish the possibility that (i) could drive our result, we attempted to equalize 
the transaction costs and uncertainties associated with being paid today versus being 
paid in the future. As was discussed in the Experimental Design section, all subjects 
had to redeem their certificates of guarantee off-site, and present payments were 
not available until one hour after the experimental session ended; the experimenters 
took care—in the detailed verbal instructions at the beginning and end of the experi-
mental session and in the instructions on the certificate of guarantee—to point out 
the consistency of the payment pickup process across present and future payments. 
An additional concern is that subjects may prefer present payments, as they may not 
be on campus on future payment dates. We do not believe that this concern is rel-
evant, since all subjects were recruited from required classes that met at least twice 
a week in the same academic quarter as all experimental sessions and all potential 
(future) payment dates. Further, four of six future payment dates were on the same 
day of the week as the experimental session (exceptions are t = 1 day and 3 days, 
the discount factors of which do not appear biased, as can be seen in Figure 1, panel 
A). Finally, we do not believe that trust differentially affected transaction costs. We 
believe that subjects trusted us, as professors, and believed that we would honor the 
certificates of guarantee. Subjects were not offered extra credit or any incentive, 
other than the experimental payments, to participate; hence, their presence alone 
would appear to demonstrate a high level of trust.
Alternate explanation (ii) is that the present value of a future payment increases 
for subjects in the positive-affect treatment because positive affect influences risk 
preferences. In particular, our result is confounded if positive affect reduces either 
the perceived uncertainty or subjects’ risk aversion associated with receiving a 
future payment relative to a present payment. Alternate explanation (iii) is that posi-
tive affect acts as a substitute for money today, making subjects in the positive-affect 
treatment more willing to postpone income to a state in which they may be in less of 
a good mood. We cannot refute (ii) and (iii) using our data, but we hope our paper 
stimulates future research that can better explain our central finding.8
8 An earlier, unpublished version of this paper argues that our proposed interpretation is more plausible than are 
(ii) and (iii); that paper is available on the AER website.
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VI. Discussion
Our research indicates that mild positive affect significantly reduces time prefer-
ence. Since this result is derived from a random-assignment experiment, the rela-
tionship between positive affect and time preference is presumably causal, with 
positive affect reducing time preference. Below, we discuss, in turn, mechanisms 
that may explain this relationship and its implications.
A. potential Mechanisms
The psychological literature, where the bulk of affect research has been 
reported, discusses two potential mechanisms that may explain why mild posi-
tive affect decreases time preference. First, Isen (2008) states that mild positive 
affect increases cognitive flexibility by broadening focus and attention, promot-
ing openness to information, and enabling improved integration of information. 
Thus, the observed reduction in time preference may result from a more thorough 
consideration of broader (including future) net benefits. In addition, support for 
this mechanism comes from what the psychological literature dubs the “dopamine 
hypothesis”: that the release of dopamine (the neurotransmitter linked to rewards) 
in areas of the brain responsible for cognitive flexibility is the mediating fac-
tor in the effect of positive affect on behavior (F. Gregory Ashby, Isen, and And 
U. Turken 1999; Isen 2008). Second, the replenishment of will power may help 
explain our result. As mentioned in the literature review, mild positive affect has 
been shown to replenish will power (Isen 2007). Consequently, postinducement, 
subjects in the positive-affect treatment should have their will power replenished 
and, thus, exhibit greater patience for a future payment.
B. Implications
In this section, we discuss what can and cannot be extrapolated from our result and 
then turn to policy implications. To understand what can be extrapolated, it is impor-
tant to recognize that the effects of affect do not lie on a continuum from intense 
positive affect to intense negative affect. In particular, the “continuum” is violated 
in three significant ways. First, the effect of intense positive affect is not necessar-
ily an amplification of the effect of mild positive affect (Isen 2007). Thus, we can-
not assume that intense positive affect would result in a further reduction of time 
preference. Second, negative affect does not necessarily have the opposite effect of 
positive affect. The independence of positive and negative affect is well established 
in psychology (Norman M. Bradburn 1969; Diener and Robert A. Emmons 1984; 
David Watson, Lee Anna Clark, and Auke Tellegen 1988; Lyubomirsky, King, and 
Diener 2005; Isen 2007). Moreover, neural research suggests the two are unrelated. 
Each is associated with a distinct neurotransmitter: dopamine with positive affect 
and serotonin with negative affect. In other words, it should not be inferred from our 
result that negative affect would necessarily increase time preference. Third, two 
affects may have variant effects, even if both are positive or negative. For example, 
anger and sadness, while both negative affects, may have different effects on deci-
sion making. In general, negative affects are more likely to have variant effects, and 
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positive affects are less likely to have variant effects (Isen 2007).9 Thus, our result 
may not be specific to the particular positive affect induced—amusement—and may 
apply to a wide range of positive affects.
We now turn to the relationship between positive affect and happiness, that is, the 
relationship between being in a happy mood and being happy. In our experiment, 
we successfully improved subjects’ mood, but were unable—not surprisingly—to 
change subjects’ underlying, long-term happiness.  Thus, can we validly claim that 
happier individuals should exhibit lower time preference?
The distinction between positive affect and happiness, and what this distinction 
means for studying the impact of happiness, have been considered by Lyubomirsky, 
King, and Diener (2005) and James Konow and Joseph Earley (2008). In the former, 
four possible strategies for identifying the impact of happiness are discussed. The least 
valid is a correlational study, due to the inherent difficulty of demonstrating causation. 
Conversely, the ideal would be a random-assignment experiment, in which underly-
ing happiness is manipulated. Such an experiment, however, is neither feasible nor 
ethical.   Hence, Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener (2005) argue that the best feasible 
approach is a random-assignment experiment in which positive affect is induced.  They 
argue that such an approach is a valid way to identify the impact of being happy since 
happier individuals experience more frequent positive affect (Diener and Martin E. P. 
Seligman 2004; Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener 2005). In fact, Diener, Ed Sandvik, and 
William Pavot (1991) state that “Frequent positive affect is both necessary and suffi-
cient to produce the state we call happiness, whereas intense positive experience is not.” 
Thus, our result suggests that happier individuals should exhibit less time preference.
Regardless of how affect and happiness are related, our result on the impact of affect 
alone has important implications. Affective shocks are ubiquitous; it is easy to for-
get how much we are subject to them. For example, quotidian experiences—a kind 
word from a loved one or the tedium of traffic—are often enough to perturb one’s 
affective state. While research on laboratory mood-inducement procedures suggests 
that the moods induced in our experiment would likely last approximately 15 minutes, 
affective shocks outside of the lab may last longer—for hours or even days.10 Indeed, 
outside of the lab, mood generated by weather has been shown to influence stock 
returns (Edward M. Saunders, Jr. 1993; David Hirshleifer and Tyler Shumway 2003); 
and affective changes due to sports outcomes have been linked to changes in political 
views, self-confidence, optimism, health, stock returns, and crime and suicide rates (see 
Alex Edmans, Diego Garcia, and Oyvind Norli 2007). That the behavioral differentials 
observed in our experiment were the result of a mild and short-lived affective shock 
underscores—and does not detract from—the potency of mood’s effect on behavior.
Mood is not the first domain in which seemingly trivial perturbations significantly 
affect behavior. Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F. Shea (2001) famously showed 
that if 401(k) has to be opted out of instead of into, both participation and savings 
rates dramatically increase. That research suggests that important decisions are not 
9 We are considering the effect of negative affects on time preference in a separate paper, specifically focusing 
on the effects of sadness, anger, and fear. Of these treatments, we have already conducted the sadness treatment and 
are now turning to the others.
10 Isen, Margaret Clark, and Mark F. Schwartz (1976) and Isen and Joyce M. Gorgoglione (1983) estimate that 
the positive affect induced by a free gift, or by reading statements with a positive valence, lasts between 10 and 
20 minutes. Further, Isen and Gorgoglione (1983) state that positive affect induced by film may last longer.
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necessarily insulated from seemingly inconsequential perturbations of the decision-
making context. Further, it has been shown that once employees make their 401(k) 
decisions, they generally do not change them. An important implication discussed 
in that research is that defaults are critical and should be designed optimally; in 
other words, policymakers should strive to “get the default right” (Madrian and Shea 
2001). Analogously, policymakers may be able to increase well-being by accounting 
for mood in the design of decision-making environments. As noted above, sports out-
comes have been shown to affect political views; hence, scheduling elections closely 
following major national sports events may be distortionary. Our result would sug-
gest that a benevolent employer could help employees increase their pension plan 
contributions by having them complete the requisite paperwork after an enjoyable 
orientation session or other mood-elevating activity. This momentary decision, influ-
enced by positive affect, would have long-lasting and important consequences. One 
can easily imagine other important decisions that could be similarly influenced.
Another practical implication of our result is that individuals may benefit from 
awareness that their mood affects their behavior. For example, a new employee 
may want to postpone pension plan contribution decisions until he or she is in a 
happy mood. The new employee may even want to proactively put him- or her-
self into a good mood. Indeed, evidence from the positive psychology literature 
suggests that people can manipulate their own affect (C. R. Snyder and Shane J. 
Lopez 2005). It should be noted that these implications are speculative, as further 
research is required to determine whether: (i) awareness of the effect of mood inter-
acts in any way with the direct effect itself; or (ii) self-induced positive affect has 
the same influence on time preference as a positive affective shock. For example, 
Loewenstein (1996) identifies a “hot-cold empathy gap,” namely that people tend 
to mispredict the impact of emotions on their behavior, especially when trying to 
assess the effect of an emotion other than the one they are currently experiencing. 
Awareness of how to objectively understand the consequences of one’s own emo-
tions can hence benefit decision makers. In summary, the practical implications of 
our research are similar to those called upon in Laibson (2001) in reference to the 
effect of cues on consumption: “ … when consumers understand these mechanisms, 
consumers try to influence the sequence of cues they experience (e.g., recovering 
alcoholics avoid the smell or sight of alcohol). Cues serve as an important endog-
enous variable, which firms, consumers, and governments try to control.”
Our research also has important theoretical implications. A host of process-oriented 
economic models speak directly to the impact of affective shocks on intertemporal deci-
sions (Loewenstein 1996; Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 2003; Loewenstein 
and O’Donoghue 2004; Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine 2006). In particular, 
our result reveals a gap in the way that economists have modeled the role of affect. 
The common theme of many relevant theoretical models is the conflict between the 
desire for immediate and delayed gratification (Adam Smith 1759; Thaler and Shefrin 
1981; Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman, and Rustichini 2001; Gul and Pesendorfer 
2001; Bernheim and Rangel 2004; Gul and Pesendorfer 2004; Loewenstein and 
O’Donoghue 2004; Benhabib and Bisin 2005; Fudenberg and Levine 2006). These 
models often include “dual selves,” and behavior results from a struggle between the 
immediate (emotional and visceral) components of the self and the purposeful, long-
term, goal-oriented components of the self. More specifically, these models predict 
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that the immediate self, and the factors that motivate it, disrupt the more reasoned and 
deliberate goals of the long-term self. So, while dual self models might effectively 
capture the phenomenon of “blind rage,” or how anger might influence behavior, how 
positive affect fits into these models is less clear.11 The need for a more nuanced view 
of affect—one that, like the psychological explanations discussed above, captures the 
salutary effect of some affects—is supported by our research. Relatedly, our research 
indicates that positive affect may change fundamental preferences. Thus, it is impor-
tant to incorporate the impact of positive affect into economic models.
Finally, an important implication for other experimental researchers is that affect 
should be neutralized at the beginning of time preference experiments. Indeed, 
uncontrolled affect may be partially responsible for the highly variant estimates of 
discount rates reported in the time preference literature (Frederick, Loewenstein, 
and O’Donoghue 2002).
In summary, our experiment adds to the mounting evidence that positive affect 
influences behavior in economically important ways. We can only speculate, how-
ever, upon how this effect comes to be. In addition, this study adds to the behavioral 
economics literature by identifying a determinant of time preference.
Appendix
11 The same can be said for relevant economic models that do not rely on dual selves, for example, Laibson’s 
(2001) cue theory of consumption.
Table A1—Results from Regressing “Live for Today” on Self-Reported Happiness
Dependent variable: Live for today (1 = “agree” and 0 = “disagree”) (1) (2)
Happiness (3 = “very happy,” 2 = “pretty happy,” 




Age squared — 0.000
(0.000)




Income below median (< $15,000) — 0.073**
(0.035)




Poor or fair health — 0.073**
(0.036)
Observations 1,636 1,636
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
3127IFCHER AND zARgHAMEE: HAppINEss AND TIME pREFERENCEVOL. 101 NO. 7
REFERENCES
Ameriks, John, Andrew Caplin, John Leahy, and Tom Tyler. 2007. “Measuring Self-Control Prob-
lems.” American Economic Review, 97(3): 966–72.
Andersen, Steffen, Glenn W. Harrison, Morten I. Lau, and E. Elisabet Rutstrom. 2008. “Eliciting Risk 
and Time Preferences.” Econometrica, 76(3): 583–618.
Andreoni, James, and Charles Sprenger. 2010a. “Risk Preferences Are Not Time Preferences: Dis-
counted Expected Utility with a Disproportionate Preference for Certainty.” National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper 16348.
Andreoni, James, and Charles Sprenger. 2010b. “Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets.” 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 16347.
Angrist, Joshua D., and Jorn-Steffen Pischke. 2009. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s 
Companion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ashby, F. Gregory, Alice M. Isen, and And U. Turken. 1999. “A Neuropsychological Theory of Positive 
Affect and its Influence on Cognition.” psychological Review, 106(3): 529–50.
Baumeister, Roy E., Ellen Bratslavsky, and Dianne M. Tice. 1998. “Procrastination and Affect Regu-
lation.” Unpublished.
Becker, Gordon M., Morris H. Degroot, and Jacob Marschak. 1964. “Measuring Utility by a Single-
Response Sequential Method.” Behavioral science, 9(3): 226–32.
Benhabib, Jess, and Alberto Bisin. 2005. “Modeling Internal Commitment Mechanisms and Self-
Control: A Neuroeconomics Approach to Consumption-Saving Decisions.” games and Economic 
Behavior, 52(2): 460–92.
Benhabib, Jess, Alberto Bisin, and Andrew Schotter. 2010. “Present-bias, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discount-
ing, and Fixed Costs.” games and Economic Behavior, 69: 205–23. 
Benjamin, Daniel J., Sebastian A. Brown, and Jesse M. Shapiro. 2006. “Who is ‘Behavioral’? Cogni-
tive Ability and Anomalous Preferences.” SSRN Working Paper 675264.
Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Antonio Rangel. 2004. “Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes.” 
American Economic Review, 94(5): 1558–90.
Bradburn, Norman M. 1969. The structure of psychological Well-Being. Chicago: Aldine Publishing 
Company.
Bucciol, Alessandro, Daniel Houser, and Marco Piovesan. 2011. “Temptation and Productivity: A Field 
Experiment with Children.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 78(1–2): 126–36. 
Burks, Stephen V., Jeffrey P. Carpenter, Lorenz Goette, and Aldo Rustichini. 2009. “Cognitive Skills 
Affect Economic Preferences, Strategic Behavior, and Job Attachment.” proceedings of the National 
Academy of sciences,106(19): 7745–50.
Coller, Maribeth, Glenn W. Harrison, and E. Elisabet Rutstrom. 2003. “Are Discount Rates Constant? 
Reconciling Theory and Observation.” University of Central Florida. Department of Economics 
Working Paper 3-31.
Coller, Maribeth, and Melonie B. Williams. 1999. “Eliciting Individual Discount Rates.” Experimental 
Economics, 2(2): 107–27.
Croson, Rachel, and Uri Gneezy. 2009. “Gender Differences in Preferences.” Journal of Economic Lit-
erature, 47(2): 448–74.
Cryder, Cynthia E., Jennifer S. Lerner, James J. Gross, and Ronald E. Dahl. 2008. “Misery is not 
Miserly: Sad and Self-Focused Individuals Spend More.” psychological science, 19(6): 525–30.
Davis, James Allen, and Tom W. Smith. 2007. General Social Surveys, 1972-2006 [machine readable 
data file]/Principal Investigator, James A. Davis; Director and Co-Principal Investigator, Tom W. 
Smith; Co-Principal Investigator, Peter V. Marsden; Sponsored by National Science Foundation. 
NORC ed. Chicago: National Opinion Research Center [producer]; Storrs, CT: The Roper Center 
for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut [distributor].
Dekel, Eddie, Barton L. Lipman, and Aldo Rustichini. 2001. “Representing Preferences with a Unique 
Subjective State Space.” Econometrica, 69(4): 891–934.
Diener, Ed, and Robert A. Emmons. 1984. “The Independence of Positive and Negative Affect.” Jour-
nal of personality and social psychology, 47(5): 1105–17.
Diener, Ed, Ed Sandvik, and William Pavot. 1991. “Happiness Is the Frequency, Not the Intensity, of 
Positive Versus Negative Affect.” In subjective Well Being: An Interdisciplinary perspective, ed. 
Fritz Strack, Michael Argyle, and Norbert Schwarz, 119–40. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Diener, Ed, and Martin E.P. Seligman. 2004. “Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of Well-Being.” 
psychological science in the public Interest, 5(1): 1–31.
Edmans, Alex, Diego Garcia, and Oyvind Norli. 2007. “Sports Sentiment and Stock Returns.” Journal 
of Finance, 62(4): 1967–98.
Erez, Amir, and Alice M. Isen. 2005. “The Influence of Positive Affect on the Components of Expec-
tancy Motivation.” Journal of Applied psychology, 87(6): 1055–67.
3128 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2011
Frederick, Shane, George Loewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue. 2002. “Time Discounting and Time 
Preference: A Critical Review.” Journal of Economic Literature, 40(2): 351–401.
Frey, Bruno S., Christine Benesch, and Alois Stutzer. 2007. “Does Watching TV Make Us Happy?” 
Journal of Economic psychology, 28(3): 283–313.
Fry, P.S. 1975. “Affect and Resistance to Temptation.” Developmental psychology, 11(4): 466–72.
Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 2006. “A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control.” American 
Economic Review, 96(5): 1449–76.
Gross, James J., and Robert W. Levenson. 1995. “Emotion Elicitation Using Films.” Cognition and 
Emotion, 9(1): 87–108.
Gruber, Jonathan, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2005. “Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers Happier?” B 
E Journal of Economic Analysis and policy: Advances in Economic Analysis and policy, 5(1): 1–43.
Gul, Faruk, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2001. “Temptation and Self-Control.” Econometrica, 69(6): 
1403–35.
Gul, Faruk, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2004. “Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption.” Econo-
metrica, 72(1): 119–58.
Harrison, Glenn W., and Morten I. Lau. 2005. “Is the Evidence for Hyperbolic Discounting in Humans 
Just an Experimental Artefact?” Behavioral and Brain sciences, 28(5): 657.
Harrison, Glenn W., Morten I. Lau, and Melonie B. Williams. 2002. “Estimating Individual Discount 
Rates in Denmark: A Field Experiment.” American Economic Review, 92(5): 1606–17.
Hinson, John M., Tina L. Jameson, and Paul Whitney. 2003. “Impulsive decision making and working 
memory.” Journal of Experimental psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29(2): 298–306.
Hirshleifer, David, and Tyler Shumway. 2003. “Good Day Sunshine: Stock Returns and the Weather.” 
Journal of Finance, 58(3): 1009–32.
Ifcher, John, and Homa Shaghaghi Zarghamee. 2011. “Happiness and Time Preference: The Effect of 
Positive Affect in a Random-Assignment Experiment: Dataset.”American Economic Review. http://
www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.101.7.3109.
Isen, Alice M. 2008. “Some Ways in Which Positive Affect Influences Decision Making and Problem 
Solving.” In Handbook of Emotions, ed. Michael Lewis, Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, and Lisa 
Feldman Barrett, 548–73. New York: The Guilford Press.
Isen, Alice M. 2007. “Positive Affect, Cognitive Flexibility, and Self-Control.” In persons in Context: 
Building a science of the Individual, ed. Yuichi Shoda, Daniel Cervone, and Geraldine Downey, 
130–47. New York: The Guilford Press.
Isen, Alice M., Margaret Clark, and Mark F. Schwartz. 1976. “Duration of the Effect of Good Mood 
on Helping: Footprints on the Sands of Time.” Journal of personality and social psychology, 34(3): 
385–93.
Isen, Alice M., and Nehemia Geva. 1987. “The Influence of Positive Affect on Acceptable Level of 
Risk: The Person with a Large Canoe has a Large Worry.” Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision processes, 39(2): 145–54.
Isen, Alice M., and Joyce M. Gorgoglione. 1983. “Some Specific Effects of Four Affect-Induction Pro-
cedures.” personality and social psychology Bulletin, 9(1): 136–43.
Isen, Alice M., Thomas E. Nygren, and Gregory F. Ashby. 1988. “Influence of Positive Affect on the 
Subjective Utility of Gains and Losses: It is just not Worth the Risk.” Journal of personality and 
social psychology, 55(5): 710–17.
Isen, Alice M., and Johnmarshall Reeve. 2005. “The Influence of Positive Affect on Intrinsic and 
Extrinsic Motivation: Facilitating Enjoyment of Play, Responsible Work Behavior, and Self-Con-
trol.” Motivation and Emotion, 29(4): 295–323.
Kahneman, Daniel, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz. 1999. Well-being: The Foundations of Hedonic 
psychology. New York: The Russel Sage Foundation.
Kirby, Kris N., and Nino Marakovic. 1996. “Delay-Discounting Probabilistic Rewards: Rates Decrease 
as Amounts Increase.” psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3(1): 100–4.
Kirby, Kris N., Nancy M. Petry, and Warren K. Bickel. 1999. “Heroin Addicts Have Higher Discount 
Rates for Delayed Rewards Than Non-Drug-Using Controls.” Journal of Experimental psychology: 
general, 128(1): 78–87.
Kirchsteiger, Georg, Luca Rigotti, and Aldo Rustichini. 2006. “Your Morals Might Be Your Moods.” 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 59(2):155–72.
Konow, James, and Joseph Earley. 2008. “The Hedonistic Paradox: Is Homo Economicus Happier?” 
Journal of public Economics, 92(1-2):1–33.
Laibson, David. 1997. “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
112(2): 443–77.
Laibson, David. 2001. “A Cue-Theory of Consumption.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1): 
81–119.
3129IFCHER AND zARgHAMEE: HAppINEss AND TIME pREFERENCEVOL. 101 NO. 7
Lerner, Jennifer S., Deborah A. Small, and George Loewenstein. 2004. “Heart Strings and Purse 
Strings.” psychological Bulletin, 15(5): 337–341.
Loewenstein, George. 1996. “Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior.” Organizational Behav-
ior and Human Decision Making, 65(3): 272–92.
Loewenstein, George, and Jennifer S. Lerner. 2003. “The Role of Affect in Decision Making”. In 
Handbook of Affective sciences, ed. Richard J. Davidson, Klaus R. Scherer, and H. Hill Goldsmith, 
619–42. New York: Oxford University Press.
Loewenstein, George, and Ted O’Donoghue. 2004. “Animal Spirits: Affective and Deliberative Processes 
in Economic Behavior.” Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics Working Paper 04-14.
Loewenstein, George, Ted O’Donoghue, and Matthew Rabin. 2003. “Projection Bias in Predicting 
Future Utility.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4): 1209–48.
Loewenstein, George, and Drazen Prelec. 1992. “Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an 
Interpretation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2): 573–97.
Lyubomirsky, Sonja, Laura King, and Ed Diener. 2005. “The Benefits of Frequent Positive Affect: 
Does Happiness Lead to Success?” psychological Bulletin, 131(6): 803–55.
Madrian, Brigitte C., and Dennis F. Shea. 2001. “The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(K) Partici-
pation and Savings Behavior.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4): 1149–87.
Mischel, Walter, Brian Coates, and Antonette Raskoff. 1968. “Effects of Success and Failure on Self-
Gratification.” Journal of personality and social psychology, 10(4): 381–90.
Mischel, Walter, Ebbe B. Ebbesen, and Antonette Raskoff Zeiss. 1973. “Selective Attention to the Self: 
Situational and Dispositional Determinants.” Journal of peronality and social psychology, 27(1): 
129–42.
Mischel, Walter, Yuichi Shoda, and Monica L. Rodriguez. 1989. “Delay of Gratification in Children.” 
science, 244(4907): 933–8.
O’Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin. 1999. “Doing It Now or Later.” American Economic Review, 
89(1): 103–24.
Oswald, Andrew, Eugenio Proto, and Daniel Sgroi. 2008. “Happiness and Productivity.” Unpublished.
Rottenberg, Jonathan, Rebecca D. Ray, and James J. Gross. 2007. “Emotion Elicitation Using Films.” 
In The Handbook of Emotion Elicitation and Assessment, ed. James A. Coan and John J. B. Allen, 
9–28. London: Oxford University Press.
Rubinstein, Ariel. 2003. “”Economics and Psychology”? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting.” Inter-
national Economic Review, 44(4): 1207–16.
Saunders, Edward M., Jr. 1993. “Stock Prices and Wall Street Weather.” American Economic Review, 
83(5): 1337–45.
Schwarz, J. Conrad, and Pamela R. Pollack.1977. “Affect and Delay of Gratification.”  Journal of 
Research in personality,11(2): 147–64.  
Seeman, Gloria, and J. Conrad Schwarz.1974. “Affective State and Preference for Immediate versus 
Delayed Reward.” Journal of Research in personality, 7(4): 384–94.
Shapiro, Jesse M. 2005. “Is There a Daily Discount Rate? Evidence from the Food Stamp Nutrition 
Cycle.” Journal of public Economics, 89(2-3): 303–25.
Smith, Adam.1759.The Theory of Moral sentiments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Snyder, C. R., and Shane J. Lopez, ed. 2005. Handbook of positive psychology.  Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Stutzer, Alois. 2007. “Limited Self-Control, Obesity, and the Loss of Happiness.” IZA Discussion 
Paper 2925.
Thaler, Richard H. 1981. “Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency.” Economic Letters, 
8(3): 201–7.
Tice, Dianne M, and Ellen Bratslavsky. 2000. “Giving in to Feel Good: The Place of Emotion Regula-
tion in the Context of General Self-Control.” psychological Inquiry, 11(3): 149–59.
Underwood, Bill, Bert S. Moore, and D. L. Rosenhan. 1973. “Affect and Self-Gratification.” Develop-
mental psychology, 8(2): 209–14.
Warner, John T., and Saul Pleeter. 2001. “The Personal Discount Rate: Evidence from Military Down-
sizing Programs.” American Economic Review, 91(1): 33–53.
Watson, David, Lee Anna Clark, and Auke Tellegen.1988. “Development and Validation of Brief Mea-
sures of Positive and Negative Affect: The PANAS Scales.” Journal of personality and social psy-
chology, 54(6): 1063–70.
Wertheim, Eleanor H., and Schwarz, J. Conrad. 1983. “Depression, Guilt, and Self-Management of 
Pleasant and Unpleasant Events.” Journal of personality and social psychology, 45(4): 884–9.
Westerman, Rainer, Kordelia Spies, Gunter Stahl, and Friedrich W. Hesse.1996. “Relative Effective-
ness and Validity of Mood Induction Procedures.” European Journal of social psychology, 26(4): 
557–80.
